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Abstract
Online video sharing platforms (e.g., YouTube, Vimeo) have become an increas-
ingly popular paradigm for people to consume video contents. Clickbait video,
whose content clearly deviates from its title/thumbnail, has emerged as a critical
problem on online video sharing platforms. Current clickbait detection solutions
that mainly focus on analyzing the text of the title, the image of the thumbnail,
or the content of the video are shown to be suboptimal in detecting the online
clickbait videos. In this paper, we develop a novel content-agnostic scheme, On-
line Video Clickbait Protector (OVCP), to effectively detect clickbait videos by
exploring the comments from the audience who watched the video. Different
from existing solutions, OVCP does not directly analyze the content of the video
and its pre-click information (e.g., title and thumbnail). Therefore, it is robust
against sophisticated content creators who often generate clickbait videos that
can bypass the current clickbait detectors. We evaluate OVCP with a real-
world dataset collected from YouTube. Experimental results demonstrate that
OVCP is effective in identifying clickbait videos and significantly outperforms
both state-of-the-art baseline models and human annotators.
Keywords: Clickbait Video, Content Agnostic, Online Video Sharing,
YouTube
1. Introduction
In the age of instant gratification, people are increasingly consuming more
video contents from the Internet (e.g., YouTube1, Vimeo2) than cable net-
works [1]. The time people spend on online media is expected to surpass the
time they spend on traditional TV worldwide in 2019 [2]. For example, YouTube
has over a billion users covering almost one-third of the Internet population and
reaches billions of views per day 3. An online video usually includes title,
1https://www.youtube.com
2https://vimeo.com/watch
3https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/press/
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thumbnail, and the video content. The title and thumbnail are visible to the
viewers before they click the video and are found to be the crucial factors that
may attract users to click and watch a video. video, whose content clearly
deviates from its title/thumbnail, is generated to entice viewers to click video
and boost the viewership of the video consequently [3]. However, the spread of
clickbait videos not only wastes the time of viewers but also decreases the trust-
worthiness of video-sharing platforms. In this paper, we focus on the problem
of reliably detecting clickbait videos online video-sharing platforms.
The detection of clickbait videos requires a careful investigation of the re-
lationship between the title/thumbnail and the video content. This problem
cannot be fully addressed by current content-based solutions which only focus
on the text of the title [4, 5], the image of the thumbnail [6, 7], or the content of
the video [8, 9]. For example, several text-based clickbait detection techniques
have been developed to identify clickbait from social media posts (e.g., the
clickbait news headline detection using word embeddings [4], clickbait tweets
detection using the linguistic feature analysis [10]). However, those solutions
cannot be adopted to address the video clickbait detection problem because the
content of the title may not be a reliable indicator to identify a clickbait video.
For example, both videos shown in Figure 1 share the same title. The video
shown in Figure 1(a) is a clickbait because it does not deliver the content the
viewers expect to see (e.g., a plane with 13 engines on each wing as shown in
its thumbnail). In contrast, Figure 1(b) is a non-clickbait video and the video
does present the ten largest airplanes in the world including the one shown in
the thumbnail.
(a) Clickbait (b) Non-clickbait
Figure 1: Examples of Clickbait and Non-clickbait Video with Similar Titles
Similarly, image-based approaches that only focus on thumbnail features
(e.g., convolutional method [6], self-consistency [11]) cannot solve the video
clickbait detection problem. For example, Figure 2 shows two videos with
very similar thumbnails. The video 2(a) in Figure 2 is a clickbait because
the video only presents some irrelevant tricks, such as how to plot letters “L”,
“O”, “V”, “E” with math functions, and never explains the equation 2 + 2 = 5.
In contrast, the video shown in Figure 2(b) is a non-clickbait as its content
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explicitly discusses some tricky methods to derive the equation 2 + 2 = 5 (e.g.,
2× 0 + 2× 0 = 5× 0).
Moreover, video authentication and verification solutions have been devel-
oped to identify fake online videos [8] and AI-generated videos [12]. However,
these solutions only focus on the video content itself and ignore the information
exposed to viewers before the video is clicked (e.g., title thumbnail). For exam-
ple, an old movie can be uploaded under a title/thumbnail identical or similar
to a recently released one. Such a clickbait video can easily bypass the video-
based detection systems as the video content is real [13]. Therefore, a reliable
online clickbait video detection tool that explicitly considers the relationship
between the title/thumbnail and the video content has yet to be developed.
(a) Clickbait (b) Non-clickbait
Figure 2: Examples of Clickbait and Non-clickbait Video with Similar Thumbnails
In this paper, we develop a novel content-agnostic scheme, Online Video
Clickbait Protector (OVCP), to effectively detect clickbait videos whose ti-
tles/thumbnails are deviating from the video content. OVCP is content-agnostic
in the sense that it does not analyze the content information of a video (i.e., title,
thumbnail, video clips). Instead, OVCP investigates the comments and discus-
sions from online users who watched the video. Our approach is motivated by
the observation that users usually make complaints or sarcastic comments when
they watch clickbait videos (e.g., “My body is crying for help watching this
video” in a clickbait video titled “28 SIGNS YOUR BODY IS CRYING FOR
HELP”). Additionally, users are observed to be less interactive in the discus-
sion of clickbait videos than non-clickbait ones given the fact that the content
of clickbait videos often appears to be tedious to the users [14]. The OVCP
scheme explores the topological and semantic structure of the user comment
networks and the latent linguistic features of user comments to identify the
unique characteristics of clickbait videos. OVCP is then integrated with a set
of state-of-the-art supervised classifiers to detect clickbait videos.
To the best of our knowledge, OVCP is the first content-agnostic approach to
address the online clickbait video detection problem. OVCP is robust against
who often generate clickbait videos that can bypass the current clickbait de-
tectors. The evaluation results on a real-world dataset collected from YouTube
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show that our OVCP scheme accurately detects clickbait videos and significantly
outperforms state-of-the-art baselines and human annotators.
2. Related Work
2.1. Clickbait Detection
Our work bears some resemblance with literature on clickbait detection on
social media platforms. The term clickbait was coined as “exaggerated head-
lines whose main motive is to mislead the reader to click on them” [15]. The
problem of clickbait has been widely studied and many solutions were pro-
vided [10, 16, 17]. The first automatic clickbait detector was proposed in [10],
where a set of handcrafted features (e.g., bag-of-words, n-grams and number
of hashtags) have been selected to train a clickbait classifier. The follow-up
solutions improve this feature engineering approach by developing deep neu-
ral network based approaches to automatically detect clickbaits without cherry
picking the features [17, 18]. Unfortunately, these schemes rely on the analysis
of the textual content (i.e., titles and descriptors) to detect clickbaits and cannot
effectively address our problem because both clickbait videos and non-clickbait
videos can share very similar titles and descriptors as shown in Figure 1.
We found there exist very few clickbait detection solutions that focus on
video-based clickbaits. In a very recent work, Qu et al. developed a crowdsourcing-
based approach where human annotators are invited to label whether the thumb-
nail of a video is clickbait or not [19]. This work requires a significant amount
of human labor and can be time-consuming if the labeled dataset is large. The
most relevant work was proposed by Zannettou et al., who developed a deep
neural network model to combine the features of the thumbnails and the statisti-
cal features of users’ comments [20]. However, this approach relies on the direct
analysis of the thumbnails which has been shown to be an unreliable indicator of
clickbait videos (Figure 2). Moreover, the scheme assumes all the videos posted
by the same user were clickbaits which is an oversimplified assumption for the
real-world scenarios where sophisticated users exist. In contrast, the proposed
OVCP scheme is the first content-agnostic approach to address the clickbait
video detection problem on video sharing platforms.
2.2. Misinformation Detection
The spread of misinformation on online social media has received a significant
amount of attention in recent years [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. There exist two
categories of misinformation detection problems that are related to ours. The
first category is called fake news detection where textual content (e.g., news
articles and social media posts) is analyzed to verify whether the news statement
is truthful or not. For example, Vo et al. developed a fake news detection scheme
that can identify a group of users who actively debunk fake information on
social media and recommend fact-checking URLs posted from these users [22].
Wang et al. developed an estimation theoretical scheme that identifies truthful
online social media posts by explicitly considering the reliability of data sources
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and source dependency [27]. The second category is commonly referred to as
“image forgery detection” schemes. For example, Zhang et al. developed a
novel fauxtography detector that can effectively track down misleading images
on social media (e.g., Twitter, Reddit) [28]. Huynh-Kha et al. developed an
image forgery detection scheme that can detect whether an image is manually
edited by copy-move, splicing or both in the same image [29].
However, the above solutions are insufficient to address the clickbait video
detection problem in this paper because sophisticated uploaders can often cre-
ate clickbait videos by using credible titles and non-edited images to bypass
the detection systems [20]. In this work, we propose a more robust content-
agnostic approach that leverages the audience’s comments to detect clickbait
videos rather than on the analysis of textual descriptors or thumbnails.
2.3. Network Embedding for Comment Feature Extraction
Extracting topological and semantic information from the comment network
is a key technique used in the proposed OVCP scheme. Various relevant net-
work embedding techniques have been proposed [30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. For example,
DeepWalk uses short random walks to learn the latent representations to de-
scribe the topological structure of a network [32]. Node2vec designs a biased
random walk procedure to learn the representation of a network that maximizes
the likelihood of preserving network neighborhoods of a node [31]. These classi-
cal methods focus on capturing the topological structure of the nodes while ig-
noring the attributes of the edge. In a more recent study, Wang et al. developed
SHINE, a network embedding technique that can capture the positive/negative
emotions of the edge in a network [30]. Huang et al. further extended the ef-
fort by proposing LANE, a general network embedding technique designed for
attributed networks [33]. Compared to SHINE, LANE is able to capture gen-
eral categorical attributes on the edges of a network. Different from the above
methods, our work encodes the unique sentiment and endorsement features of
the user comment network for the purpose of detecting clickbait videos.
3. Problem Definition
In this section, we present the online clickbait video detection problem. First,
we define a few key terms that will be used in the problem formulation.
Definition 1. Video (Vi): it is a publicly available video instance uploaded
to the online sharing platforms (Figure 3). Each video, denoted as Vi, contains
five elements: title (Ti), thumbnail (Mi), description (Di), comments (Ci), and
the ground truth label (zi) of the video. Formally, Vi is denoted as a quintuple
Vi = (Ti,Mi, Di, Ci, zi). Additionally, we define a video set of N videos as
V = {V1, V2, · · · , VN}.
Definition 2. Title (Ti): it is a piece of brief textual information provided by
the video uploader to describe the video content. An example of a video title is
shown in Figure 3(a).
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(a) Title and Thumbnail (b) Description
(c) Sample Comments
Figure 3: Example of an Online Video and Its Components
Definition 3. Thumbnail (Mi): it is an image that provides a visual de-
scription of the video content. YouTube video creators are allowed to choose a
thumbnail generated automatically by the YouTube algorithm, which is typically
a frame from the video, or to upload a customized image. An example of a video
thumbnail is shown in Figure 3(a).
Definition 4. Description (Di): it includes the description provided by the
video creator, and the video’s meta information (e.g., number of views, number
of likes). An example of a video description is shown in Figure 3(b).
Definition 5. Comments (Ci): they include all the comments and reviews
of a video from its viewers. An example of the comment section of a video is
shown in Figure 3(c).
Definition 6. Clickbait Video (labeled as “true”): a video is defined as
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clickbait if its title and/or thumbnail is intentionally crafted to attract viewers’
attention, and entice them to click the accompanied video whose content clearly
deviates from the title and/or thumbnail.
Definition 7. Non-clickbait Video (labeled as “false”): any video that is
not in the clickbait video category.
Based on the above definitions, the clickbait video detection is a binary
classification problem that targets at classifying each video into two categories,
i.e., clickbait or non-clickbait. The problem is formulated as:
arg max
z˜i
Pr(z˜i = zi|Vi), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N (1)
where z˜n denotes the estimated label for video Vn.
4. Solution
In this section, we present the Online Video Clickbait Protector (OVCP) to
address the problem formulated in the previous section. Our scheme consists
of four major components as shown in Figure 4. This first component is a Net-
work Feature Extraction module that extracts topological and semantic features
from the audience interactive discussions and comments of a video. The second
component is a Linguistic Feature Extraction module that learns the vector rep-
resentations of user comments and extracts linguistic features of the comments
(e.g., document embeddings). The third component is a Metadata Feature Ex-
traction module that extracts auxiliary metadata features of the video (e.g.,
number of views, number of likes). The last component is a Supervised Classi-
fication module that identifies the clickbait videos using the features extracted
from the first three components.
Figure 4: An Overview of OVCP
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4.1. Network Feature Extraction
The network feature extraction component in OVCP is designed to cap-
ture characteristics from the audience’s comments of an online video. We ob-
serve that clickbait and non-clickbait videos are different in terms of topological
features (e.g., structure of comment threads) and semantic features (e.g., sen-
timents, endorsements) of audience’s comments. To effectively capture both
topological and semantic features, the network feature extraction component
constructs a comment network, records the network attributes by a Random
Walk scheme, and learns the vector representation via an autoencoding ap-
proach.
4.1.1. Comment Network Construction for Individual Video
We first construct a network of user comments that represents the topological
structure and semantic attributes/features of the user comments. A comment
network G for each video is defined as a directed graph G = (V,E), where V
is the set of nodes and E is the set of directed edges between nodes. We define
a source node s ∈ V to be the description of the video, and other nodes (i.e.,
v ∈ V, v 6= s) to be all comments of the video. Each edge (v, v′) ∈ E denotes a
reply from comment v to comment v′.
Different from other trending social media platforms (e.g., Reddit) that have
a multi-level comment structure, YouTube only allows a two-level commentary
mechanism, namely a top-level comment and its replies (i.e., second-level com-
ments to the top-level comment). In other words, each comment thread is
recorded as the top-level comment followed by all of its replies in a flat struc-
ture. To retrieve the comment network structure, in each comment thread,
we connect the top-level comment node to the source node s and direct all
second-level comment nodes to their top-level comment node. When a specific
user (e.g., a username following a “+” or “@” ) is mentioned in a second-level
comment, the comment node is redirected to the latest comment node of the
mentioned user in the same thread. Note that a comment can receive any num-
ber of replies but can only reply to one comment. In other words, each node v
can have any number of incoming edges but only one outgoing edge.
Figure 5 demonstrates the networks constructed from the comments of a
clickbait video and a non-clickbait video. We observe that the comment network
of a clickbait video has a few “hub” comment nodes that receive more replies
than normal comment nodes. For example, a comment like “Who else come
for the thumbnail?” receives a large number of replies from other viewers who
suffer from the same clickbait video. We also observe that non-clickbait videos
contain longer comment threads since users are more likely to discuss the topic
presented in the video through interactive replies if the video is not a clickbait.
4.1.2. Semantic Feature Extraction with Random Walks
After the comment network G of a video is constructed, we further extract
the semantic features (i.e., sentiment and endorsement) from the comment net-
work. We observe that such semantic features of a comment can sometimes
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(a) Clickbait (b) Non-clickbait
Figure 5: Examples of the Comment Network Structure for Clickbait and Non-clickbait Videos
Note: for better visualization, we only keep threads with more than one comments in the plot.
‘
reveal the user’s attitude and behavior towards a possible clickbait video. There-
fore, it makes sense to incorporate them into our OVCP scheme. In particular,
we adopt a Random Walk (RW) algorithm [31] in the constructed network to
capture these two semantic features.
A random walk RW (M,K) scheme often traverses a graph M times while
limiting the number of steps in each traverse path to be at most K [32]. In the
OVCP scheme, we trace not only the reply direction of a comment node but
also the attributes of the comment node. Intuitively, in each traversal of the
comment network G, we randomly select a comment node and record its path
until it reaches the source node or the length of the path reaches K. We define
the two attitude paths below to track the semantic features (i.e., sentiment
and endorsement) of each comment node in the RW process. In particular, we
define two semantic features as attributes of each comment node v: i) sentiment
attribute αs(v) is defined as the polarity score extracted by a sentiment analysis
tool TextBlob4, and ii) endorsement attribute αe(v) is defined as the number of
likes a comment received from other users.
Definition 8. Sentiment Path (RWs): is the random walk process that tra-
verses the graph G from a randomly selected comment node v0 and records the
sentiment attribute αs of each comment node on the path. In each step, the
random walk process follows the direction to the next comment node that the
current comment node replies to. Formally, for the mth walk in the process,
RWs(m) = {RWs(m, 0), RWs(m, 1), · · · , RWs(m,K − 1)} where RWs(m, k) =
αs(vk) represents the sentiment attribute of the k
th node vk on the path.
The Sentiment Path RWs captures the sentiment feature of the comment
network. Figure 6 demonstrates an example of the sentiment attribute in the
comment network. We observe that the comment sentiments from non-clickbait
4https://textblob.readthedocs.io/
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videos are more diverse than clickbait videos. This is because the comments
from viewers of non-clickbait videos primarily focus on the content of the video
and usually reflect the diversified attitudes (e.g., like vs. dislike) towards the
video. Another reason is that viewers often leave a clickbait video immediately
without making any comment. Such rational user behavior reduces not only the
number of comments a clickbait video receives but also its likelihood of getting
diversified comments.
(a) Clickbait (b) Non-clickbait
Figure 6: Sentiment Feature Path. The color of each node represents the sentiment attribute
of the corresponding comment, i.e., red - positive, blue - negative, grey - neutral.
Definition 9. Endorsement Path (RWe): is the random walk process that
traverses the graph G from a randomly selected comment node v0 and records
the endorsement attribute αe of each comment node on the path. In each step,
the random walk process follows the direction to the next comment node that
the current comment node replies to. Formally, for the mth walk in the process,
RWe(m) = {RWe(m, 0), RWe(m, 1), · · · , RWe(m,K − 1)} where RWe(m, k) =
αe(vk) represents the endorsement attribute of the k
th node vk on the path.
The Endorsement Path RWe captures the endorsement a comment receives
in the comment network. It reflects the agreement from other users on a partic-
ular comment. Figure 7 demonstrates an example of the endorsement attribute
in the comment network. We observe that only a few comments in clickbait
videos receive a large amount of endorsements from other users. We find these
comments are often the ones that point out the video is a clickbait, which are ap-
preciated/endorsed by other users. The degree of endorsements in non-clickbait
videos is much more diversified since users are more engaged in the discussion
of the video content instead of endorsing or disputing it.
We perform the random walk process M times with a maximum length of
K for each attribute path, and denote each path with RWs(m) and RWe(m)
for the mth walk of the sentiment and endorsement attribute respectively. If
attribute paths RWs(m) and RWe(m) arrive at the source node s before the
length of the path reaches K, i.e., vk = s and k < K, RWs(m) and RWe(m) are
padded with neutral sentiment and zero endorsement respectively. We store the
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(a) Clickbait (b) Non-clickbait
Figure 7: Endorsement Feature Path. The size of each node represents the endorsement
attribute of the corresponding comment, i.e., the number of likes a comment received.
K attributes recorded in M random walk paths into feature matrices (Hs and
He) of size M ×K, where Hs(m, k) = RWs(m, k) and He(m, k) = RWe(m, k).
4.1.3. Network Representation Learning
Given the high-dimensional network features of the comment network G,
namely Hs and He extracted by the Random Walk algorithm, we further encode
the network features into a low-dimensional vector space and learn the latent
vector representation for them. An autoencoder is a generative deep learning
technique that captures hidden patterns of high dimensional data with artificial
neural networks [35]. It consists of an encoder E(x) : Rn → Rm that reduces
the feature space dimension from n to m, where m n. The reduction is done
through one or more layers of neural networks, and a decoder D(z) : Rm → Rn
that recovers the encoded vector to its original dimensionality.
It has been shown that deep autoencoder is an effective way of nonlinear
dimensionality reduction [36]. In our scheme, we compress the network feature
vectors Hs and He by independently training two stacked autoencoders with
respect to the sentiment and endorsement attributes. Formally, our stacked
autoencoder structure consists of six neural network layers, and the ith layer is
defined as:
Zi = φ(Wi ·Xi + bi) (2)
where φ(·) is a nonlinear activation function, Wi is the weighting factor and
bi is the bias term. Xi and Zi are the input and output of each layer. We
set the input of the first layer to be the network feature vectors Hs and He for
the sentiment and endorsement autoencoder, respectively. We use Mean Square
Error (MSE) as the loss function for the stacked autoencoder and the rectified
linear unit (ReLU) as the activation function.
Finally, the latent features (i.e., Zs and Ze) learned from the stacked au-
toencoders are aggregated by a concatenation function, Z =< Zs,Ze >, which
represents the network features extracted from the comment network.
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4.2. Linguistic Feature Extraction
In the second component, we extract linguistic features from the comment
section by learning the document embedding of each comment. Figure 8 shows
the word clouds of most frequent words from the comments of clickbait and
non-clickbait videos, respectively. Intuitively, we observe that clickbait related
words (e.g., “clickbait”, “bait”, “fake”, “thumbnail”) appear more frequently
in the comments of clickbait videos while content-related words (e.g., “lava”,
“card”, “voice”) appear more often in the discussion of non-clickbait videos.
(a) Clickbait (b) Non-clickbait
Figure 8: Word Clouds
Therefore, we employ a widely adopted document embedding technique,
namely Doc2vec [37], to extract linguistic features from comments (i.e., com-
ment embedding). Doc2vec, derived from the famous Word2vec framework, is
designed to learn fixed-length continuous distributed vector representations for
word sequences of variable-length.
A na¨ıve approach is to simply embed the whole comment section of each
video. However, we found such an approach performs poorly due to the ex-
tremely long or short comment length of some videos. In particular, we found
a majority of comment threads only have one comment, but some threads have
hundreds of comments. To capture the information of both short and long com-
ment threads, we design a hierarchical embedding process as follows: 1) we first
embed each single comment using the Doc2vec model; 2) each long comment
thread is traversed using the Random Walk process and the recorded comment
path is further embedded by calculating the mean of comment embeddings in
the path (referred to as path embedding); 3) we train another independent 8-
layer stacked autoencoder to reduce the dimension of the path embeddings.
Using this hierarchical embedding method, we can control the dimensionality
of the linguistic feature space while preserving the information captured by the
Doc2vec framework.
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4.3. Metadata Feature Extraction
We further extract some complementary metadata features that are relevant
in identifying clickbait videos but cannot be captured by network and linguis-
tic clues discussed above. These metadata features are mainly selected based
on empirical observations. For example, we observe that some clickbait videos
contain URLs to malicious websites in the video descriptors. We extract a total
of 13 metadata features from the collected real-world dataset. These metadata
features are shown in Table 1. These features are computed to describe statis-
tical characteristics of both the video content (e.g., video length, the number
of views) and the comments of the video (e.g., the word count of a comment,
the number of likes of a comment). The correlation plot of all the metadata
features is shown in Figure 9. We observe that the extracted metadata features
are relatively independent.
Table 1: Metadata Features
Feature Description
Comment Count Total # of comments for each video
Dislike Count Total # of dislikes for each video
Like Count Total # of likes for each video
View Count Total # of views for each video
Like to Dislike The ratio of like count to dislike count
Daily View Count Avg. # of daily views for each video
Like to View The ratio of like count to view count
Duration Length of video in minutes
Description URL Count Avg. # of URLs in the description
Like Count per Comment Avg. # of likes for each comment
Word Count per Comment Avg. # of words in each comment
Clickbait Count
Avg. # of words related to clickbait in
each comment
Weighted Clickbait Count
Avg. # of words related to clickbait in
each comment weighted by comment’s
like count
4.4. Supervised Classification
Finally, we combine all the network, linguistic and metadata features de-
scribed above and perform the binary classification to detect online clickbait
videos. In the supervised classification module, we adopt a few state-of-the-art
classification algorithms and select the best-performed one as the classifier for
our OVCP scheme. The supervised classifiers include probabilistic classifiers,
support vector machine, boosting and ensemble methods, and neural networks.
The detailed performance evaluation for the collection of classifiers and the
OVCP scheme is presented in the following section.
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Figure 9: Metadata Feature Correlation
5. Evaluation
In this section, we first describe the dataset we collected from YouTube.
We then evaluate the performance of the OVCP scheme in comparison with
state-of-the-art baselines on the collected dataset. The results show that OVCP
significantly outperforms both the compared baseline methods and human an-
notators in terms of accurately detecting online clickbait videos.
5.1. Dataset
YouTube is visited by over 1.9 billion logged-in users each month and over a
billion hours of video are watched daily5. In view of the diversity and popularity
of , we take YouTube as our data source to collect video information.
For the training dataset, considering the imbalanced nature of clickbait
videos on YouTube, we leverage YouTube’s recommendation system to effi-
ciently collect clickbait videos being recommended to real users and to minimize
human bias in the data collection process. First, we randomly assigned a set
of trending videos recommended by YouTube to three independent human an-
notators who collectively identified a set of “seed” clickbait videos by manually
watching them (we set the size of the seed set to be 40 in our experiment due
to the high labeling cost). We then created a dummy account on YouTube and
let YouTube recommend relevant videos based on the watching history of the
5https://www.youtube.com/intl/en-US/yt/about/press/
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“seed” videos. Using such a method, we collected a training dataset of 500 videos
which is a reasonable sample size to study the online video detection problem
on YouTube [38]. Note that, in the training set, we intentionally collect more
clickbait videos so that the training set is relatively balanced. This allows us to
train the model more effectively [39]. To ensure fairness, we use the same train-
ing data for all baselines. In order to evaluate the performance in a real-world
scenario, we randomly collected 125 videos from the “trending video” section
YouTube’s homepage. This strategy allows the collected videos to have a simi-
lar clickbait video percentage as that on YouTube due to its nature of random
sampling. In particular, following the common practice in supervised machine
learning [40] and the Pareto principle (i.e., 80/20 rule)6 of training/testing data
split, we selected 500 videos as the training set and 125 videos as the testing
set, and performed 5-fold cross-validation in our evaluation.
For each of these videos, we recorded its unique videoID and collected the
ground-truth label (i.e., whether the video is a clickbait or not) based on the
majority voting of human annotations. We also collected the title, description,
thumbnail, comments and commentThreads 7, and the content of each video
through the YouTube Data API8. An overview of the collected dataset is sum-
marized in Table 2. We observe that the comments in the collected videos follow
a “long tail” distribution. As shown in Figure 10, most comments in a thread
have no replies (i.e., number of comments per thread is 1) and only a small
portion of the threads have multiple comments.
Table 2: Data Trace Statistics
Dataset Train Test
Video Label Clickbait Non-clickbait Clickbait Non-clickbait
Videos 128 372 13 112
Comment Threads 388,337 2,050,438 50,139 243,213
Comments 506,407 2,771,672 59,523 287,045
Comments per Thread 1.30 1.35 1.19 1.18
Distinct Users 419,392 2,072,927 51,998 246,481
Unique Words in Comments 156,201 551,552 37,330 119,270
5.2. Baselines
We integrate the following state-of-the-art supervised classifiers [41] with
our scheme as discussed in Section 4.4: Logistic Regression (LR), Linear Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM), AdaBoost, Random Forest (RF), and Multi-layer
Perceptron (MLP). We select the best-performed one to be the one used in our
6https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto principle
7An attribute that records the structure of each comment thread in the comment section
8https://developers.google.com/youtube/v3/
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Figure 10: Distribution of Comments Count per Thread
OVCP scheme. We compare the performance of our scheme with the following
representative baselines in clickbait detection 9.
• Image-based Clickbait Detection (VGG-16): A convolutional neural
network approach (pre-trained on ImageNet) that detects the clickbait
video using only the image content of the thumbnail [42].
• Stop Clickbait (ASONAM16): A linguistic-based clickbait classifica-
tion approach that detects the clickbait video based on the title content
of the video [43].
• Clickbait Detection using Deep Learning (NGCT16): A deep neu-
ral network approach that identifies clickbait videos using a compiled click-
bait corpus from social media posts[15].
• Clickbait Video Detection (SPW18): A deep learning based ap-
proach that detects clickbait video on YouTube using features from the
headline, thumbnail, comments and video statistics [20].
5.3. Detection Accuracy
In the first set of experiments, we evaluate the performance of our scheme
when it is coupled with a set of classifiers and identify the best-performed one
as the OVCP scheme. The evaluation metrics involved in measuring the ef-
fectiveness of clickbait video detection include Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and
9The online video clickbait detection problem is a largely unsolved research problem.
Therefore, we only have a limited number of baselines from the literature to compare against.
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F1-Score, which are commonly used in binary classification tasks. In addition,
we include two imbalanced metrics, Cohen’s Kappa (Kappa) and Matthews Cor-
relation Coefficient (MCC), because our dataset is not perfectly balanced (see
Table 2). For all classification methods and baselines, we perform 5-fold cross-
validation in the parameter tuning process.
In the OVCP scheme, we set the parameters in each component primarily
based on our empirical observation as follows: i) random walk : we set M = 100
and K = 5; ii) stacked autoencoder (network): we set the size of encoding layers
to be 256, 64 and 16, and the size of decoding layers to be 64, 256 and 500; iii)
Doc2vec: the length of the comment embedding is set to be 256; and iv) stacked
autoencoder (linguistic): we set the size of encoding layers to be 128, 64, 32 and
16, and the size of decoding layers to be 32, 64, 128 and 256.
The performance of all compared schemes is summarized in Table 3. We
observe that AdaBoost performs the best among all classifiers and thus is se-
lected to be the default classifier in the OVCP scheme. We also observe that our
scheme outperforms all baseline approaches all evaluation metrics. In particu-
lar, comparing to the VGG-16, ASONAM16, NGCT16 and SPW18 baselines,
our scheme achieves a performance gain of 0.3262, 0.2219, 0.1943 and 0.1229
on the F1-score respectively. Although the SPW18 approach considers various
content-based features (e.g., headline, thumbnail, video statistics) in its model,
it is found to be less effective than our scheme in detecting clickbait videos. The
reason is that the SPW18 method has a high-dimensional input vector size of
855 that requires a vast amount of training samples to achieve a reasonable per-
formance. The SPW18 approach also relies on visual features (i.e., thumbnail)
which can be misleading in detecting the clickbait videos.
Table 3: Clickbait Classification Performance for All Methods
Algorithms Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score Kappa MCC
AdaBoost (OVCP) 0.8960 0.5000 0.4615 0.4800 0.4223 0.4227
LR 0.8800 0.4286 0.4615 0.4444 0.3773 0.3776
SVM 0.8880 0.4545 0.3846 0.4167 0.3552 0.3567
RF 0.8640 0.3889 0.5385 0.4516 0.3763 0.3828
MLP 0.8480 0.2857 0.3077 0.2963 0.2112 0.2114
VGG-16 0.8240 0.1538 0.1538 0.1538 0.0556 0.0556
ASONAM16 0.8160 0.2222 0.3077 0.2581 0.1561 0.1588
NGCT16 0.8400 0.2667 0.3077 0.2857 0.1961 0.1968
SPW18 0.8560 0.3333 0.3846 0.3571 0.2765 0.2774
Additionally, we plot the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
of all schemes to evaluate the robustness of their performance with respect to
the classification threshold. As shown in Figure 11, our scheme consistently
outperforms all baselines and achieves an increase of 0.09 on the AUC score
compared to the baseline of best performance (i.e., NGCT16).
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Figure 11: ROC Curve of All Schemes
5.4. Feature Analysis
In the second experiment, we study the importance of features in each cat-
egory (i.e., network, linguistic, metadata) and their combinations. The results
are shown in Table 4. We observe that the combination of all features achieve
the best results on all evaluation metrics which confirms their necessity in our
model. We also observe that linguistic features achieve the best performance
among all single feature categories, and the combination of linguistic and meta-
data features achieve the best performance among the combination of any two
feature categories.
Table 4: Classification Performance for All Feature Sets
Feature Set Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
All Features 0.8960 0.5000 0.4615 0.4800
Metadata 0.7680 0.1364 0.2308 0.1714
Network 0.8240 0.1538 0.1538 0.1538
Linguistic 0.8480 0.2000 0.1538 0.1739
Network & Metadata 0.8720 0.2857 0.1538 0.2000
Linguistic & Metadata 0.8400 0.2941 0.3846 0.3333
Network &Linguistic 0.8560 0.2727 0.2308 0.2500
5.5. Influence of Training Size
In the third experiment, we further study the robustness of our scheme
against the size of the training set. In particular, we evaluate the performance
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of the OVCP scheme and all other baselines by increasing the size of the training
set from 30% to 100% of the entire set. The F1-score results are reported in
Figure 12. We observe that the performance of our scheme generally improves as
the size of the training set increases and continues to outperform other baselines.
Figure 12: Size of Training Set vs. Performance (F1 Score)
5.6. Detection Time
In the fourth experiment, we measure the detection performance of the
OVCP scheme against the time frame after the video is posted. Specifically,
we limit the comment data in our scheme to be within a time frame from the
corresponding video’s publishing time, and increase the time frame from 10
minutes to 24 hours. The classification results are summarized in Table 5. We
observe that the OVCP scheme using the first 10 minutes after the video’s pub-
lication has already outperformed all content-based baselines with a non-trivial
performance gain. Moreover, the OVCP scheme is observed to reach its optimal
performance within 24 hours.
5.7. Detection Efficiency
In the fifth experiment, we empirically measure the efficiency (i.e., detection
time per video) of all schemes. The results are shown in Figure 13. We observe
that the OVCP scheme achieves the best detection performance (F1 score) with
a reasonable detection time compared to other baselines. We also observe that
the SPW18 approach is the slowest among all compared schemes. This is be-
cause SPW18 requires features to be extracted from multiple data modalities,
including image (i.e., thumbnail), texts (i.e., video title and description) and
metadata. Such a large feature space significantly reduces the detection ef-
ficiency. The NGCT16 has the least detection time since it simply relies on
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Table 5: Classification Performance v.s. Detecting Time Frame
Time Frame Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
OVCP (Within 10 Minutes) 0.8640 0.3571 0.3846 0.3704
OVCP (Within 30 Minutes) 0.8560 0.3684 0.5385 0.4375
OVCP (Within 1 Hour) 0.8640 0.3889 0.5385 0.4516
OVCP (Within 6 Hours) 0.8720 0.4118 0.5385 0.4667
OVCP (Within 12 Hours) 0.8880 0.4615 0.4615 0.4615
OVCP (Within 24 Hours) 0.8960 0.5000 0.4615 0.4800
OVCP (All Comments) 0.8960 0.5000 0.4615 0.4800
VGG-16 0.8240 0.1538 0.1538 0.1538
ASONAM16 0.8160 0.2222 0.3077 0.2581
NGCT16 0.8400 0.2667 0.3077 0.2857
SPW18 0.8560 0.3333 0.3846 0.3571
pre-trained word embeddings to predict clickbait videos via a deep learning
framework, which in turn limits its detection accuracy.
Figure 13: Performance (F1 Score) v.s. Average Detection Time Cost (per Video)
Finally, we study the computational complexity/scalability of our OVCP
scheme. In particular, we perform an empirical study of different modules of
the OVCP scheme for a detailed analysis. The results are shown in Figure 14.
We observe that the linguistic and network feature extraction modules are the
two dominant ones that consume most of the execution time of the OVCP
scheme. The reason is that these dominant modules include neural network
solutions (i.e., doc2vec and autoencoder) for latent feature extraction, which
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often involve a non-trivial amount of matrix operations in both learning and
inference phases of the process [44]. However, we observe the computation time
of those two dominant modules increase linearly as the size of the input data
increases, which demonstrates the good scalability of our scheme with larger
datasets.
We also note that, in our current implementation, the videos are detected
in a sequential manner, i.e., one video is detected after another. This leads
to the linear growth of the execution time as the number of videos becomes
large. We observe that our OVCP scheme can be easily extended to further
improve its speed by leveraging the parallel GPU programming frameworks
such as CUDA10 to execute many video streams in parallel on thousands of
GPU cores. Moreover, elastic distributed computing systems such as AWS
Kubernetes11 can also allow new OVCP instances to spin up on virtual machines
when the system is overloaded (e.g., when many new videos are uploaded).
Considering this line of effort is beyond the scope of this paper, we plan to
implement it in our future work.
Figure 14: Computation Time for All Modules of OVCP
5.8. Human Performance Comparison
In the last experiment, we compare the performance of OVCP with human
annotators12. In particular, we invited three independent annotators (different
10https://developer.nvidia.com/cuda-zone
11https://kubernetes.io/
12The difference between the human annotators in this experiment and the human an-
notators we used in collecting the ground truth labels is that we did not allow the human
annotators in this experiment to watch the actual videos before they generate the annotations.
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from the ones who were invited to generate the ground truth labels) to identify
clickbait videos from the same testing dataset used for the OVCP scheme. First,
we asked these annotators to annotate videos by only showing them the title,
thumbnail and view count of each video which exactly the same information a
YouTube user receives before clicking a video. Next, we asked these annotators
to annotate the videos by also giving them access to the comment section of
the videos (i.e., metadata and comment features). The performance of each
individual annotator and the aggregated results using the majority voting (i.e.,
“overall” and “overall+comment”) are shown in Table 6. We also report false
positive rate (FPR), and false negative rate (FNR) in addition to accuracy and
F1 score metrics to study what kinds of mistakes the human annators made.
We observe that the OVCP scheme consistently outperforms human annotators
in detecting clickbait videos, demonstrating the necessity of developing such a
tool. We also observe the human annotators often perform worse when they
are not allowed to access the comments of the video, especially in terms of false
negative rate ( missing many clickbait videos).
Table 6: Comparison between OVCP and Human Performance
Accuracy F1-Score FPR FNR
OVCP 0.8960 0.4800 0.0536 0.5385
Annotator 1 (without comments) 0.7040 0.0976 0.2321 0.8462
Annotator 1 (with comments) 0.7440 0.1579 0.1964 0.7692
Annotator 2 (without comments) 0.6880 0.1333 0.2589 0.7692
Annotator 2 (with comments) 0.7360 0.1951 0.2143 0.6923
Annotator 3 (without comments) 0.7520 0.1143 0.1786 0.8462
Annotator 3 (with comments) 0.7920 0.1875 0.1429 0.7692
Overall (without comments) 0.7280 0.1053 0.2054 0.8462
Overall (with comments) 0.7680 0.1714 0.1696 0.7692
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we develop a content-free scheme (OVCP) to detect clickbait
videos on online video sharing platforms. Our scheme leverages the comment
and interaction between users who watched the video, and learns latent features
from their unstructured and complex comments. We evaluate our scheme using
the real-world data collected from YouTube. The results demonstrate that our
scheme is more accurate than both state-of-the-art clickbait detection tools and
human annotators in identifying online clickbait videos.
Finally, we also outline a few future research directions that can be built
on the work from this paper. First, clickbait videos on YouTube are often
customized by experienced content creators who know how to game with the
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YouTube recommendation system. To make the OVCP scheme more robust
and generalizable across different video platforms, we plan to extend OVCP’s
compatibility with other video sharing platforms using different commentary
structures. Examples of such platforms include both video-centric platforms
(e.g., Vimeo) and social-based platforms (e.g., Twitter). Second, there exist
many marketing vendors from which content creators can buy comments and
high-retention views. In future work, we will further study how to identify
and filter such fake or machine-generated comments. A possible solution is to
leverage the social media bot detection techniques [45] and train a classifier that
can discriminate comments generated by humans and bots. Meanwhile, we can
also adopt the truth discovery [21] and fact-checking [46] approaches to verify
the truthfulness of the user comments. The authors believe the above extensions
will further improve the effectiveness and robustness of the OVCP scheme in
detecting online clickbait videos.
References
[1] GroupM, Groupm introduces state of digital report, available at https://
www.groupm.com/news/groupm-introduces-state-digital-report, accessed
2019-01-07 (2018).
[2] R. Molla, Next year, people will spend more time online than they will
watching tv. that’s a first., available at https://www.recode.net/2018/6/
8/17441288/internet-time-spent-tv-zenith-data-media, accessed 2019-02-
14 (2018).
[3] M. Ba¨rtl, Youtube channels, uploads and views: A statistical analysis of
the past 10 years, Convergence 24 (1) (2018) 16–32 (2018).
[4] M. M. U. Rony, N. Hassan, M. Yousuf, Diving deep into clickbaits: Who use
them to what extents in which topics with what effects?, in: Proceedings
of the 2017 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social
Networks Analysis and Mining 2017, ACM, 2017, pp. 232–239 (2017).
[5] D. Wang, T. Abdelzaher, L. Kaplan, Social sensing: building reliable sys-
tems on unreliable data, Morgan Kaufmann, 2015 (2015).
[6] M. D. Zeiler, R. Fergus, Visualizing and understanding convolutional net-
works, in: European conference on computer vision, Springer, 2014, pp.
818–833 (2014).
[7] Y. Zhang, N. Vance, D. Zhang, D. Wang, On opinion characterization in
social sensing: A multi-view subspace learning approach, in: 2018 14th
International Conference on Distributed Computing in Sensor Systems
(DCOSS), IEEE, 2018, pp. 155–162 (2018).
23
[8] O. Papadopoulou, M. Zampoglou, S. Papadopoulos, Y. Kompatsiaris, Web
video verification using contextual cues, in: Proceedings of the 2nd Inter-
national Workshop on Multimedia Forensics and Security, ACM, 2017, pp.
6–10 (2017).
[9] D. Y. Zhang, L. Song, Q. Li, Y. Zhang, D. Wang, Streamguard: A bayesian
network approach to copyright infringement detection problem in large-
scale live video sharing systems, in: 2018 IEEE International Conference
on Big Data (Big Data), IEEE, 2018, pp. 901–910 (2018).
[10] M. Potthast, S. Ko¨psel, B. Stein, M. Hagen, Clickbait detection, in: Eu-
ropean Conference on Information Retrieval, Springer, 2016, pp. 810–817
(2016).
[11] M. Huh, A. Liu, A. Owens, A. A. Efros, Fighting fake news: Image splice
detection via learned self-consistency, in: Proceedings of the European Con-
ference on Computer Vision (ECCV), 2018, pp. 101–117 (2018).
[12] Y. Li, M.-C. Chang, H. Farid, S. Lyu, In ictu oculi: Exposing ai generated
fake face videos by detecting eye blinking, arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.02877
(2018).
[13] K. Fagan, Youtube’s clickbait problem might
not be fixable, available at https://yr.media/tech/
youtubes-clickbait-problem-is-out-of-hand-and-there-may-be-no-fixing-it/,
accessed 2019-02-25 (2018).
[14] To clickbait or not to clickbait: What you need to know about
headlines and clickbaits, available at https://marketinginsidergroup.com/
content-marketing/what-you-need-to-know-headlines-clickbaits/, accessed
2019-02-19 (2016).
[15] A. Agrawal, Clickbait detection using deep learning, in: 2016 2nd Interna-
tional Conference on Next Generation Computing Technologies (NGCT),
IEEE, 2016, pp. 268–272 (2016).
[16] M. Potthast, T. Gollub, K. Komlossy, S. Schuster, M. Wiegmann, E. P. G.
Fernandez, M. Hagen, B. Stein, Crowdsourcing a large corpus of clickbait
on twitter, in: Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Com-
putational Linguistics, 2018, pp. 1498–1507 (2018).
[17] A. Anand, T. Chakraborty, N. Park, We used neural networks to detect
clickbaits: You won’t believe what happened next!, in: European Confer-
ence on Information Retrieval, Springer, 2017, pp. 541–547 (2017).
[18] P. Thomas, Clickbait identification using neural networks, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1710.08721 (2017).
[19] J. Qu, A. M. Hißbach, T. Gollub, M. Potthast, Towards crowdsourcing
clickbait labels for youtube videos.
24
[20] S. Zannettou, S. Chatzis, K. Papadamou, M. Sirivianos, The good, the
bad and the bait: Detecting and characterizing clickbait on youtube, in:
2018 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), IEEE, 2018, pp. 63–69
(2018).
[21] D. Y. Zhang, J. Badilla, Y. Zhang, D. Wang, Towards reliable missing truth
discovery in online social media sensing applications, in: 2018 IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and
Mining (ASONAM), IEEE, 2018, pp. 143–150 (2018).
[22] N. Vo, K. Lee, The rise of guardians: Fact-checking url recommendation
to combat fake news, arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.07516 (2018).
[23] X. Yin, J. Han, P. S. Yu, Truth discovery with multiple conflicting infor-
mation providers on the web, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering 20 (6) (2008) 796–808 (Jun. 2008). doi:10.1109/TKDE.2007.
190745.
[24] D. Wang, M. T. Amin, S. Li, T. Abdelzaher, L. Kaplan, S. Gu, C. Pan,
H. Liu, C. C. Aggarwal, R. Ganti, et al., Using humans as sensors: an
estimation-theoretic perspective, in: Information Processing in Sensor Net-
works, IPSN-14 Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on,
IEEE, 2014, pp. 35–46 (2014).
[25] D. Wang, T. Abdelzaher, L. Kaplan, C. C. Aggarwal, Recursive fact-
finding: A streaming approach to truth estimation in crowdsourcing ap-
plications, in: Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), 2013 IEEE 33rd
International Conference on, IEEE, 2013, pp. 530–539 (2013).
[26] D. Zhang, D. Wang, N. Vance, Y. Zhang, S. Mike, On scalable and ro-
bust truth discovery in big data social media sensing applications, IEEE
Transactions on Big Data (2018).
[27] D. Wang, L. Kaplan, H. Le, T. Abdelzaher, On truth discovery in social
sensing: A maximum likelihood estimation approach, in: Proc. ACM/IEEE
11th Int Information Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN) Conf, 2012, pp.
233–244 (Apr. 2012). doi:10.1109/IPSN.2012.6920960.
[28] D. Y. Zhang, L. Shang, B. Geng, S. Lai, K. Li, H. Zhu, M. T. Amin,
D. Wang, Fauxbuster: A content-free fauxtography detector using social
media comments, in: 2018 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big
Data), IEEE, 2018, pp. 891–900 (2018).
[29] T. Huynh-Kha, T. Le-Tien, S. Ha-Viet-Uyen, K. Huynh-Van, M. Luong,
A robust algorithm of forgery detection in copy-move and spliced images,
IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Appli-
cations 7 (3) (2016).
25
[30] H. Wang, F. Zhang, M. Hou, X. Xie, M. Guo, Q. Liu, Shine: Signed hetero-
geneous information network embedding for sentiment link prediction, in:
Proceedings of the Eleventh ACM International Conference on Web Search
and Data Mining, ACM, 2018, pp. 592–600 (2018).
[31] A. Grover, J. Leskovec, node2vec: Scalable feature learning for networks,
in: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge discovery and data mining, ACM, 2016, pp. 855–864 (2016).
[32] B. Perozzi, R. Al-Rfou, S. Skiena, Deepwalk: Online learning of social
representations, in: Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGKDD international
conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, ACM, 2014, pp. 701–
710 (2014).
[33] X. Huang, J. Li, X. Hu, Label informed attributed network embedding, in:
Proceedings of the Tenth ACM International Conference on Web Search
and Data Mining, ACM, 2017, pp. 731–739 (2017).
[34] Y. Zhang, Y. Lu, D. Zhang, L. Shang, D. Wang, Risksens: A multi-view
learning approach to identifying risky traffic locations in intelligent trans-
portation systems using social and remote sensing, in: 2018 IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Big Data (Big Data), IEEE, 2018, pp. 1544–1553
(2018).
[35] P. Vincent, H. Larochelle, Y. Bengio, P.-A. Manzagol, Extracting and com-
posing robust features with denoising autoencoders, in: Proceedings of the
25th international conference on Machine learning, ACM, 2008, pp. 1096–
1103 (2008).
[36] G. E. Hinton, R. R. Salakhutdinov, Reducing the dimensionality of data
with neural networks, science 313 (5786) (2006) 504–507 (2006).
[37] Q. Le, T. Mikolov, Distributed representations of sentences and docu-
ments, in: Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning - Volume 32, ICML’14, JMLR.org,
2014 (2014).
[38] P. Bajaj, M. Kavidayal, P. Srivastava, M. N. Akhtar, P. Kumaraguru,
Disinformation in multimedia annotation: Misleading metadata detection
on youtube, in: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM workshop on Vision and
Language Integration Meets Multimedia Fusion, ACM, 2016, pp. 53–61
(2016).
[39] X.-Y. Liu, J. Wu, Z.-H. Zhou, Exploratory undersampling for class-
imbalance learning, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics,
Part B (Cybernetics) 39 (2) (2008) 539–550 (2008).
[40] P. M. Domingos, A few useful things to know about machine learning.,
Commun. acm 55 (10) (2012) 78–87 (2012).
26
[41] E. Alpaydin, Introduction to machine learning, MIT press, 2014 (2014).
[42] X. Zhang, J. Zou, K. He, J. Sun, Accelerating very deep convolutional
networks for classification and detection, IEEE transactions on pattern
analysis and machine intelligence 38 (10) (2015) 1943–1955 (2015).
[43] A. Chakraborty, B. Paranjape, S. Kakarla, N. Ganguly, Stop clickbait:
Detecting and preventing clickbaits in online news media, in: Proceedings
of the 2016 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social
Networks Analysis and Mining, IEEE Press, 2016, pp. 9–16 (2016).
[44] J. A. Hertz, Introduction to the theory of neural computation, CRC Press,
2018 (2018).
[45] E. Ferrara, O. Varol, C. Davis, F. Menczer, A. Flammini, The rise of social
bots, Communications of the ACM 59 (7) (2016) 96–104 (2016).
[46] D. Wang, B. K. Szymanski, T. Abdelzaher, H. Ji, L. Kaplan, The age of
social sensing, Computer 52 (1) (2019) 36–45 (2019).
27
